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PRECAP; Clark Fork Coalition v. Tubbs: Well, Well, Well, If It Isn’t 
Another Combined Appropriation . . . 
 
  Brian Geer 
 
I.   QUESTIONS PRESENTED 
 
1. Did the district court err in ruling that an administrative rule 
defining “combined appropriation” conflicted with the Montana 
Water Use Act? 
 
2. Did the district court err in reinstating a previous version of the 
administrative rule? 
 
II.   FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
This case revolves around the term “combined appropriation”1 as 
it applied to the “exempt well” statute2 of the Water Use Act.3 Specifically, 
the issue is whether or not two or more “combined appropriations” of 
groundwater developments need to be physically connected so as to 
exclude them from the exempt well statute. 
Put simply, the exempt well statute allows small appropriations of 
water (via wells, drainages, etc.) to circumvent the Department of Natural 
Resources and Conservation’s (DNRC) permitting process. As originally 
drafted, an exempt well was defined as a well “with a maximum yield of 
less than one hundred (100) gallons a minute.”4 In 1987, the Legislature 
added an exception to the exception, stating that a “combined 
appropriation” of two or more wells from the same source would need a 
permit if together they exceeded the 100 gallon per minute (“gpm”) limit.5 
Accordingly, the DNRC adopted a rule defining “combined 
appropriation,” which specifically stated that the “[g]roundwater 
developments need not be physically connected.”6  
In 1991, the Legislature amended the exempt well statute to 
reduce the maximum flow rate to 35 gpm and to include an annual volume 
limit of ten acre-feet per year.”7  Two years later, the DNRC redefined the 
term “combined appropriation” to mean that the appropriations need to be 
“physically manifold into the same system.”8  
                                           
1 ADMIN. R. MONT. 36.12.101(13) (1993). 
2 MONT. CODE ANN. § 85–2–306 (2015). 
3 MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 85–2–101, et. seq. 
4 Revised Code Mont. § 89–880(4) (1973). 
5 Revised Code Mont. § 89–880(5). 
6 ADMIN. R. MONT. 36.12.101(7) (1987). 
7 MONT. CODE ANN. § 85–2–306(3)(a)(iii). 
8 ADMIN. R. MONT. 36.12.101(13). 
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In 2009, the Clark Fork Coalition, along with several ranchers 
with senior water rights, filed a petition with the DNRC for declaratory 
ruling and requested an amendment to the 1993 definition.9 After receiving 
the Clark Fork Coalition’s petition, the DNRC analyzed the definition of 
“combined appropriation.” Using the process set out in the Montana 
Administrative Procedure Act (“MAPA”),10 it decided that the definition 
was consistent and not in conflict with applicable law under the Water Use 
Act.”11 The district court used a hypothetical to illustrate its point that the 
exempt well statute allows for “larger consumptive water uses to be 
established without going through the permitting process.”12 The district 
court suggested that a 1,000-lot subdivision, each house with an exempt 
well appropriated from the same source, would avoid the permitting 
process and have a significant effect on senior water rights.13 
Subsequently, the Clark Fork Coalition filed a complaint with the 
district court seeking review of the denied petition.14 After a failed attempt 
between the Clark Fork Coalition and the DNRC to reach a stipulated 
agreement, the case was re-opened in 2014.15 On October 17, 2014, the 
district court found in favor of the Clark Fork Coalition and declared that 
the DNRC’s 1993 definition conflicted with the purpose of the Water Use 
Act.16 The district court invalidated the 1993 rule and reinstated the 1987 
definition until the DNRC rewrote the rule.17 
Though the DNRC elected not to appeal, the intervenors from the 
district court proceedings—the Montana Well Driller’s Association, the 
Montana Association of Realtors, and the Montana Building Industry—
appealed the ruling separately.18 Both the Clark Fork Coalition and the 
intervenor Mountain Water Company wrote briefs supporting the district 
                                           
9 Opening Brief of Intervenors/Appellants Montana Ass’n of Realtors & Montana Building Industry 
Ass’n at 1, Clark Fork Coalition v. Tubbs, 
https://supremecourtdocket.mt.gov/search/getDocument?documentid=124616 (Mont. Nov. 17, 2015) 
(No. DA 14-0813). 
10 MONT. CODE ANN § 2–4–305(6). 
11 Intervenor/Appellants Montana Well Driller’s Assoc.’s Opening Brief at 3, Clark Fork Coalition v. 
Tubbs https://supremecourtdocket.mt.gov/search/getDocument?documentid=124614 (Mont. Nov. 18, 
2015) (No. DA 14-0813) (quoting Declaratory Ruling, File 2, Tab 54, p.6., COR, RA BDV-2010-874, 
Doc. 3, Appendix 1).  
12 Order on Petition for Judicial Review at 9 https://www.google.com/url?q=http://leg.mt.gov/content/ 
Committees/Interim/2015-2016/Water-Policy/Meetings/Sept-2015/ClarkForkCoalition_v_DNRC-
opinion.pdf&sa=U&ved=0ahUKEwi_nfPZzdPMAhVUz2MKHcY1BAwQFggFMAA&client=intern
al-uds-cse&usg=AFQjCNHPeJPl_WpAZiHXRCx9re-i1eIozw (Mont. Oct. 17, 2014) (No. BDV–
210–874). 
13 Id. at 10. 
14 Answer Brief of the Clark Fork Coalition et al. at 3, Clark Fork Coalition v. Tubbs, 
https://supremecourtdocket.mt.gov/search/getDocument?documentid=129429 (Mont. Jan. 15, 2016) 
(No. DA 14-0813). 
15 Id. at 4. 
16 Id.; See Order, supra note 12, p. 13, App. 2. 
17 Id. 
18 Id. 
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court’s ruling.19 Additionally, both the appellants and appellees are joined 
in briefing by amicus curiae.20 
 
III.   ISSUES ON APPEAL 
 
Based on the extensive briefing by the appellants, appellees, and five 
amici curiae, there are too many issues to address in oral argument. The 
parties will likely spend most of their time addressing the two most 
important issues: 1) whether the district court correctly interpreted the 
DNRC’s definition, and 2) whether the district court’s remedy was proper 
after ruling against the 1993 definition.  
 
A.   Whether the DNRC’s Definition of “Combined Appropriation” Was 
Inconsistent with the Purpose of the Water Use Act 
 
1.  Appellants’ Arguments 
 
Both the Montana Well Driller’s Association’s brief and the 
combined brief of the Montana Association of Realtors and the Montana 
Building Industry (collectively “the appellants”) argue that the district 
court erroneously invalidated the 1993 rule. “The District Court failed to 
analyze whether the 1993 Rule is consistent with the exempt well statute, 
conceding that DNRC correctly determined its rule is consistent with the 
plain reading of the term ‘combined appropriation.’”21 “The prohibition 
on ‘combined appropriations’ means a person shall not connect two or 
more wells or developed springs together in order to exceed the 35-gpm 
flow rate and 10-acre-foot volume limitation.”22 The appellants argue that 
the complete phrase “combined appropriation” means a physical joining 
of appropriations into one appropriation.23 The appellants contend that a 
plain reading of the statute means the wells must be physically combined. 
In order to rule against an agency’s rule, the definition must be “plainly 
and palpably inconsistent” with the statutory language; the appellants 
argue it was not.24  
The original purpose of the exempt well statute, the appellants 
argue, “has always been to provide a property owner with the ability to 
make a small groundwater appropriation without having to go through 
                                           
19 Answer Brief of the Clark Fork Coalition et al., supra note 14, at 4; Intervenor/Appellants Montana 
Well Driller’s Assoc.’s Opening Br., supra note 11, at 4.  
20 The Montana Association of Counties and the Water Systems Council have written briefs in support 
the appellants, while the Montana League of Cities and Towns, Montana Trout Unlimited, and 
Bitterrooters for Planning, et al., have written briefs supporting the appellees.  
21 Intervenor/Appellants Montana Well Drillers Assoc.’s Opening Brief, supra note 11, at 16. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. 
24 Moe v. Wesen, 172 F.Supp 259, 263 (Mont. 1959). 
76 MONTANA LAW REVIEW ONLINE Vol. 77 
 
DNRC’s permitting requirements.”25 Under the 1987 Rule, a combined 
appropriation did not require that the wells were physically manifold 
together, which made sense, according to the Appellants, because the 1987 
Rule also had no volume restriction.26 However, in light of the 1993 
amendment to the Rule, which significantly decreased the flow rate and 
imposed a volume limit to the exempt well statute, the appellants argue 
that the DNRC was right to remove it from the definition.27 According to 
the appellants, narrowing the limitation on exempt wells “made it 
physically impossible to circumvent the purposes of the ‘combined 
appropriation’ term without physically connecting two or more wells 
together in order to make one large appropriation.”28  
The appellants argue, however, that allowing each person the 
ability to appropriate his or her own exempt well is the express purpose of 
the statute, and that the DNRC has redundant protections available to 
protect senior water users besides requiring a permit.29 Contrary to the 
appellees’ contention, “the 1993 Rule is not a ‘loophole’ allowing the use 
of exempt wells for large consumptive uses. By the very plain reading of 
the statute, exempt wells are allowed to be utilized by anyone who has a 
property interest where the well is located and who does not appropriate 
more than 35 GPM and 10 acre-feet of water a year.”30 
Finally, the appellants argue that the district court did not give 
enough deference to the agency’s decision to reword the definition to 
include “physically manifold.” According to case law, the regulatory 
agency is given deference when the interpretation of its rule has stood for 
a considerable length of time.31 Of course, a court can overrule the 
longstanding interpretation, but only when its decision is based on 
“compelling indications.”32 The DNRC had already determined that the 
1987 rule was “ambiguous and difficult to administer” and specifically 
changed the meaning to address this difficulty.33 Additionally, the exempt 
well statute has been modified almost every session since 1993 and has 
never changed the definition of “combined appropriation.”34 The 
Appellants argue that the district court gave too much weight to legislative 
                                           
25 Intervenor/Appellants Montana Well Drillers Assoc.’s Opening Brief, supra note 11, at 20. 
26 Id. at 23. 
27 Id. at 24.  
28 Id. 
29 Intervenor/Appellants Montana Well Drillers Assoc.’s Opening Brief, supra note 11, at 35, 36. 
Appellant’s Brief mentions two other protections available to concerned water users: establishing a 
controlled groundwater area under MONT. CODE ANN. § 85–2–206, or creating a stream depletion 
zone under MONT. CODE ANN. § 85–2–380. Id. at 36. 
30 Id. at 42. 
31 Mont. Trout Unlimited v. Mont. Dep’t of Nat. Res. & Conserv., 113 P.3d 224, 231 (Mont. 2006). 
32 Mont. Power Co. v. Mont. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 26 P.3d 91, 94 (Mont. 2001). 
33 Opening Brief of Intervenors/Appellants Montana Ass’n of Realtors & Montana Building Industry 
Ass’n, supra note 9, at 7. The brief cited 1993 Mont Admin. Reg. 1334A (June 24, 1993), in which 
the DNRC stated that it had a difficult time “fairly and consistently” administering the 1987 definition 
of “combined appropriation” because of its ambiguous terms. 
34 Intervenor/Appellants Montana Well Drillers Assoc.’s Opening Brief, supra note 11, at 26. 
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intent and relied on an “uncorroborated and unspecified concern that 
multiple wells were being utilized for residential development” which 
might affect senior water rights.35  
 
2. Appellees’ Argument 
 
The appellees contend that the district court correctly analyzed the 
plain language, the legislative history, and the overall purpose of the Water 
Use Act in ruling that a combined appropriation need not be physically 
connected.36 “Since 1973, when the statute was adopted, a comprehensive 
system for permitting new appropriations forms the backbone of Montana 
water law.”37 Ultimately, the appellants argue that the DNRC’s process of 
permitting groundwater developments was the means for the State, who 
owns the water, to conserve its use. The DNRC itself acknowledged that 
adding the “physically manifold” requirement “had caused exempt wells 
to proliferate, that the problem was especially acute in closed basins, and 
that the rule needed to be changed.”38 
The appellees state that the plain language of the exempt well 
statute, the legislative intent of the 1987 Rule, and the overall purpose of 
the Water Use Act all support a definition of “combined appropriation” 
which does not have a physical requirement. The plain language, the 
appellees argue, indicates that the plain language denotes “distinct things, 
not two or more connected things.”39 Nothing suggests that the 
developments must be manifold or physically connected in order to be 
combined.40  
Additionally, the appellees argue that the legislative intent behind 
the 1987 Rule did not state the wells needed to be physically connected. 
The appellees argue that, because the 1987 Legislature wrote the law, its 
intent provides the only relevant legislative history. “In the construction 
of a statute, the primary duty of the court is to give effect to the intention 
of the Legislature enacting it.41 Appellees point out that the appellants 
concede that the original drafting of the rule did not care about whether 
the wells were physically connected.42 
                                           
35 Opening Brief of Intervenors/Appellants Montana Ass’n of Realtors & Montana Building Industry 
Ass’n, supra note 9, at 20–21. 
36 Answer Brief of The Clark Fork Coalition et al., supra note 14, at 11. 
37 Answer Brief of Intervenor/Appellee Mountain Water Company at 7, Clark Fork Coalition v. Tubbs, 
https://supremecourtdocket.mt.gov/search/getDocument?documentid=129135 (Mont. Jan. 15, 2016) 
(No. DA 14-0813). 
38 Answer Brief of the Clark Fork Coalition et al., supra note 14, at 3. 
39 Id. at 15. 
40 Id. 
41 State v. Hays, 282 P. 32, 34 (Mont. 1929). 
42 Answer Brief of The Clark Fork Coalition et al., supra note 14, at 16; see also Intervenor/Appellants 
Montana Well Drillers Assoc.’s Opening Brief, supra note 11, at 23 (“The District Court also looked 
at DNRC’s enactment of the 1987 Rule, which did not require that two wells be physically connected 
to be a combined appropriation.”). 
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The Water Use Act was enacted not only to protect natural 
resources, but also to allow beneficial appropriation of water.43 The 
appellees argue that, contrary to the purpose of the Act, the 1993 Rule both 
allows large consumptive use without a permit and improperly puts the 
burden on senior water right holders to protect their own rights.44 “The 
public policy underlying the provision was to prevent large consumptive 
users of all types [not just irrigators] from circumventing the water 
permitting process.”45 This circumvention, the appellees argue, both 
endangers existing senior water rights through the risk of 
overconsumption and encumbers senior water owners to affirmatively 




Questions of water law are often especially contentious because 
of the inherent countervailing interests: conservation and beneficial use. 
“The District Court determined the central purpose of the Act was to 
implement a permitting system, which in turn provided notice to other 
water users to take action in order to protect their established water 
rights.”46 It is possible, however, that the district court concerned itself too 
much with the exempt well statute and ignored the nature of the exception; 
that is, exceptions are specifically cut out from the general rule. The 
exempt well statute is not at issue, and this carve out for small wells has 
been expressly allowed by the Act.47 The appellants state that the act is not 
simply about permitting and controlling water use, but also 
“‘encourag[ing] the wise use of the state’s water resources’ and [seeking] 
the stabilization of streamflows.’”48 Siding with the appellants would 
prevent a watering down of the nature of the exception. 
Conversely, by expanding the definition of an exception, the Court 
would risk lessening the available protections to senior water rights 
owners. The Water Use Act is based partially on the idea of “first in time, 
first in right” with respect to water appropriators.49 As the appellees point 
out, the broadening of a permitting exclusion could potentially upend the 
protections specifically provided for senior water right owners. Indeed, 
that is precisely what happened here, as the Clark Fork Coalition and 
several concerned ranchers preemptively sought to protect their rights 
from being harmed by the DNRC’s interpretation of the rule. Under the 
                                           
43 Answer Brief of The Clark Fork Coalition et al., supra note 14, at 25. 
44 Id. 
45 Id. at 23. 
46 Intervenor/Appellants Montana Well Drillers Assoc.’s Opening Brief, supra note 11, at 28 (citing 
Order, supra note 12, p.5, App. 2). 
47 Intervenor/Appellants Montana Well Drillers Assoc.’s Opening Brief, supra note 11, at 30. 
48 Hohenlohe v. State, 240 P.3d 628, (Mont. 2010) (citing MONT. CODE ANN. § 85–2–101(3)). 
49 Featherman v. Hennessy, 115 P. 983, 986 (Mont. 1991); Answer Brief of Intervenor/Appellee 
Mountain Water Co. at 14. 
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broad 1993 Rule, the appellees feared that they would not only have no 
notice of a potentially substantial appropriation, but they would have no 
opportunity to object to said appropriation.50 While the appellants note that 
there are redundant protections implemented in the Water Use Act,51 as 
stated in the appellee’s brief, the exclusion was intended to be narrow 
because a narrow interpretation gives preference to senior appropriators 
and protects water sources from being overconsumed.52  
Finally, while both parties argued in detail about the plain 
language of the statute in their briefs, the Supreme Court may not ask for 
much discussion on this. The Court is not allowed to give deference to the 
agency because this issue is reviewed de novo.53  Additionally, the district 
court specifically mentioned that it gave due deference to the DNRC’s 
interpretation. As such, the Supreme Court is unlikely to review it.  
 
B.   Whether Reinstatement of the 1987 Rule Was Appropriate 
 
1.  Appellants’ Argument 
 
Even if the district court properly struck down the 1993 Rule as 
invalid, the appellants argue that the district court erred by reinstating the 
1987 definition rather than remanding the issue back to the DNRC so that 
it could amend the rule.54 Appellants argue that the district court created 
its own rule and subverted the MAPA.55 A court is limited by the MAPA 
and can only “affirm a decision of an agency, remand back to the agency 
for further proceedings, reverse the agency decision, or modify the 
decision.”56 The appellants contend that reinstating the 1987 Rule—which 
was expressly found unworkable over 20 years ago—does not comply 
with the MAPA.57 “Unless a rule is adopted in substantial compliance with 
these procedures [e.g. the MAPA], the rule is not valid.”58  
Finally, the appellants contend that the district court also 
overstepped its constitutional authority by reinstating the 1987 Rule 
because it did not give the people an opportunity to be present at the 
rulemaking.59 The DNRC is the executive branch and has the sole 
authority to “adopt rules necessary to implement and carry out the 
                                           
50 Answer Brief of Intervenor/Appellee Mountain Water Co., supra note 37, at 17, 30. 
51 Intervenor/Appellants Montana Well Drillers Assoc.’s Opening Brief, supra note 11, at 36. 
52 Answer Brief of Intervenor/Appellee Mountain Water Co., supra note 37, at 19–20. 
53 Answer Brief of The Clark Fork Coalition et al., supra note 14, at 10. 
54 Opening Brief of Intervenors/Appellants Montana Ass’n of Realtors & Montana Building Industry 
Ass’n, supra note 9, at 13. 
55 MONT. CODE ANN. § 2–4–101, et seq. 
56 Intervenor/Appellants Montana Well Drillers Assoc.’s Opening Brief, supra note 11, at 40 (See 
MONT. CODE ANN. § 2–4–704). 
57 Intervenor/Appellants Montana Well Drillers Assoc.’s Opening Brief, supra note 11, at 26–28. 
58 State v. Vainio, 35 Pl.3d 948, (2001). 
59 Opening Brief of Intervenors/Appellants Montana Ass’n of Realtors & Montana Building Industry 
Ass’n, supra note 9, at 15. 
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purposes” of the Water Use Act.60 The appellants accuse the district court 
of simply instating a rule that complied with its Order, thereby violating 
the Separation of Powers Doctrine.61 The appellants argue the district court 
should have ordered the DNRC to re-write the rule instead of assuming an 
executive role and creating a new rule to fit its Order.62 The appellants 
content that the district court denied the people an opportunity to 
participate in the operation of a governmental agency prior to its final 
decision.63 Because there was no such opportunity, the appellants state that 
the remedy set down by the district court is unavailable as it violates the 
both the MAPA and the Montana Constitution. 
 
2. Appellee’s Arguments 
 
 The appellees claim that the district court’s remedy of remanding 
back to the DNRC and reinstating the 1987 Rule in the interim was 
appropriate. The appellees state that the district court did not create a new 
rule, but rather gave guidelines for the DNRC to follow in rewriting the 
rule.64 “[T]he scope and content of a future rule—whatever it may be—
does not change the fact that the 1993 rule defining ‘combined 
appropriation’ . . . is too narrow [and is] in conflict with legislative 
intent.”65  
 Additionally, they contend that reinstatement of the old rule was 
proper because the district court has broad discretion in its remand 
procedures. Under the MAPA, the district court can provide any remedy 
not barred by statute.66 The appellees claim that because there is no 
statutory restriction in the MAPA, the district court has broad power to 
enforce equitable remedies.67 Accordingly, “the effect of invalidating an 
agency rule is to reinstate the rule previously in force.”68 Put simply, the 
district court, not wanting “to impose chaos upon DNRC,” used its equity 
power to implement a previous administrative rule until the DNRC created 
a new rule.69  
 
                                           
60 MONT. CODE ANN. § 85–2–113(2). 
61 Intervenor/Appellants Montana Well Drillers Assoc.’s Opening Brief, supra note 11, at 37. 
62 Id. 
63 Opening Brief of Intervenors/Appellants Montana Ass’n of Realtors & Montana Building Industry 
Ass’n, supra note 9, at 16–17 (citing Mont. Const. art. II, § 8 (1972); MONT. CODE ANN. § 2–3–101 
(1975)).  
64 Answer Brief of The Clark Fork Coalition et al., supra note 12, at 35 (“[F]uture rulemaking is not 
predetermined . . . . The only sideboard is a legal one; the final rule must be consistent with . . . the 
district court’s order”). 
65 Answer Brief of The Clark Fork Coalition et al., supra note 14, at 36. 
66 Id. at 37. 
67 Id. 
68 Answer Brief of Intervenor/Appellee Mountain Water Co., supra note 37, at 35 (citing Paulsen v. 
Daniels, 413 F.3d 999, 1008 (9th Cir. 2005) cited by Defenders of Wildlife v. Salazar, 776 F.Supp.2d 
1178, 1186 (D. Mont. 2011)).   
69 Order, supra note 12, p. 13, App. 2. 
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3. Analysis 
 
 The Court must analyze whether or not, after invalidating the 
current definition of “combined appropriation,” the district court acted 
within its power by reinstating the 1987 Rule. Of course, this issue need 
not be addressed if the Court finds that the 1993 Rule is valid. 
 There have been several attempts to re-write the definition of 
“combined appropriation,” though none so far have been successful. As 
stated above, after the Clark Fork Coalition originally filed suit, the two 
parties attempted to enter into a stipulated agreement that the DNRC 
would amend the definition to exclude the physically manifold 
requirement, but this ultimately failed because the parties could not agree 
on a definition.70 Additionally, there have been at least two failed attempts 
by the Legislature to successfully define the statute, one in 2005 and one 
in 2013.71 Once the district court invalidated the 1993 Rule, it set up a 
vacuum which it had no way of filling other than reinstating the 1987 Rule.  
 However, the Supreme Court could potentially take issue with the 
district court’s reinstatement of a dated and unworkable rule. As the 
appellants and appellees agree, the rule must be “valid and not in conflict 
with the statute.”72 The DNRC specifically stated that the 1987 Rule was 
difficult to administer “fairly and consistently.”73 Not only was the 
definition of “combined appropriation” changed, but the water limits of 
the underlying exempt well statute were significantly altered.74 Moreover, 
the appellees seem to be arguing that the 1993 Rule did not meet the 
current needs of Montana’s growing population and water needs, but that 
reinstating an even older version is an adequate remedy.75 It is difficult to 
see how reinstating the 1987 Rule would be consistent with the Water Use 
Act. 
 
IV.   CONCLUSION 
 
 Water law remains a particularly contentious issue in Montana, 
and the Court must carefully balance the appellants’ right to use water with 
the appellee’s “first in time” right. By narrowing the definition of 
“combined appropriation,” the Court risks overreaching by severely 
limiting an exception specifically enacted by the Legislature. Conversely, 
by broadening the definition, the Court risks undermining the “first in 
time” rule. Ultimately, the appellants will have a difficult time arguing 
                                           
70 Answer Brief of The Clark Fork Coalition et al., supra note 14, at 3–4. 
71 Id. at 21–22; Intervenor/Appellants Montana Well Drillers Assoc.’s Opening Brief, supra note 11, 
at 27. 
72 MONT. CODE ANN. § 2–4–305(6). 
73 Opening Brief of Intervenors/Appellants Montana Ass’n of Realtors & Montana Building Industry 
Ass’n, supra note 9, at 7. 
74 MONT. CODE ANN. § 85–2–306(3)(a). 
75 Answer Brief of Intervenor/Appellee Mountain Water Co., supra note 37, at 39. 
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against the longstanding rule protecting the rights of senior owners. By 
reinstating a dated and unworkable rule, however, the district court may 
have overreached, and the Court will have to determine the proper 




















   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
